The two computer scientists at the university’s Montefiore Institute describe the work in a short paper for the Financial Cryptography and Data Security conference. Jacquot told CoinDesk, which published the story on 20 November, that on Bitcoin the attacks began “a second or a few seconds after the bait was set up”.

What a reused nonce gives away

A wallet signs a payment with the owner’s private key and a random number that must never be used twice. If one key signs two messages with the same number, the two signatures form two equations with two unknowns, the number and the key, and anyone who reads the blockchain can solve them. Nonces shared between different keys can expose them too: 15 keys turned up only when the six chains were searched together.

After Bitcoin came Dogecoin with 195 keys, Ethereum with 119, Litecoin 9, Bitcoin Cash 6 and Dash 1. The authors name three causes: a nonce that makes signatures shorter and fees lower, used in 2.48 million Bitcoin transactions; buggy software, such as an Android flaw of 2013; and numbers apparently picked by hand, like 123456.

The bait

On 28 April 2025 the team put $3 to $5 into addresses built to be vulnerable. On Bitcoin, transactions grabbing the coins reached the queue of unconfirmed payments the second the keys could be computed, and at least two attackers raced for one address. CoinDesk traced one trap: six new addresses got 7,200 satoshis each, two of them signed with the same nonce, and once one key had reused it, its remaining 5,200 satoshis went to a stranger’s address.

The fast bots took only a key that repeats its own nonce; the other Bitcoin traps went in one sweep on 11 May 2025. On Ethereum every trap was emptied after about three hours. A trap that needed Bitcoin and Ethereum watched together was still untouched in December 2025.

Where the money figure comes from

The €101 million adds up each vulnerable address at its richest moment, at prices of 25 November 2024. The most that could have been taken at any one time was about €25 million, in December 2014. “Our paper doesn’t try to differentiate real attacks from benign withdrawals,” Jacquot told CoinDesk.

The fix dates from 2013: RFC 6979 derives the nonce from the key and the message, so two different payments practically never share one. The authors published their key-recovery tool and two practice levels for Ethernaut, a security game for Ethereum developers. Mistakes a holder can catch, such as fake sites and wallet drainers, are on the hub’s safety page.